or in practice (Krueger, 2003) ? What is the effect of hiring one more police officer (Levitt, 1997) ?
While in many contexts we can treat labor as a homogenous input, many social programs (and other applications) involve human services and so the specific worker can matter a great deal. Variability in worker productivity (e.g., Gordon, Kane and Staiger, 2006) means ∂Y/∂L depends on which new teacher or cop is hired. Heterogeneity in productivity also means that estimates for the effect of hiring one more worker are not stable across contexts -they depend on the institutions used to screen and hire the marginal worker.
With heterogeneity in labor inputs, economics can offer two contributions to the study of productivity in social policy. The first is standard causal inference around shifts in the level and mix of inputs. The second, which is the focus of our paper, is insight into selecting the most productive labor inputsthat is, workers. This requires prediction. This is a canonical example of what we have called prediction policy problems (Kleinberg et al., 2015) , which require different empirical tools from those common in micro-economics. Our normal tools are designed for causal inference -that is, to give us unbiased estimates for some . These tools do not yield the most accurate prediction, , because prediction error is a function of variance as well as bias. In contrast, new tools from machine learning (ML) are designed for prediction. They adaptively use the data to decide how to trade off bias and variance to maximize out-of-sample prediction accuracy.
In this paper we demonstrate the socialwelfare gains that can result from using ML to improve predictions of worker productivity.
We illustrate the value of this approach in two important applications -police hiring decisions and teacher tenure decisions.
I. Hiring Police
Our first application relates to efforts to reduce excessive use of force by police and improve police-community relations, a topic of great policy concern. We ask: By how much could we reduce police use of force or misbehavior by using ML rather than current hiring systems to identify high-risk officers and replace them with average-risk officers?
For this analysis we use data from the Philadelphia Police Department (PPD) on 1,949 officers hired by the department and enrolled in 17 academy classes from 1991-98 (Greene and Piquero, 2004) . Our main dependent variables capture whether the officers were ever involved in a police shooting or accused of physical or verbal abuse (see Chalfin et al., 2016 for more details about the data, estimation and results).
Candidate predictors come from the application data and include sociodemographic attributes (but not race/ethnicity), veteran or marital status, surveys that capture prior behavior and other topics (e.g., ever fired, ever arrested, ever had license suspended), and polygraph results.
We randomly divide the data into a training and test set, and use five-fold cross-validation within the training set to choose the optimal prediction function and amount by which we should penalize model complexity to reduce risk of over-fitting the data ("regularization.")
The algorithm we select is stochastic gradient boosting, which combines the predictions of multiple decision trees that are built sequentially, with each iteration focusing on observations not well predicted by the sequence of trees up to that point (Hastie, Tibshirani and Friedman, 2008) . One concern is that we may be confusing the contribution to these outcomes of the 
II. Promoting Teachers
The decision we seek to inform is different in our teacher application: We try to help districts decide which teachers to retain (tenure) after a probationary period, rather than the decision we study in our policing application regarding whom to hire initially.
Like previous studies, we find that a very limited signal can be extracted at hiring about who will be an effective teacher. Once people have been in the classroom, in contrast, it is possible to use a (noisy) signal to predict whether they will be effective. Value-Add (TVA). Kane et al. (2013) leverage the random assignment of teachers to students in the second year of the MET study to overcome the problem of task confounding and validate their TVA measure.
We seek to predict future productivity using (Krueger, 2003) .
We assume following Rothstein (2015) that the decision we study here -replacing the bottom 10% of teachers with average teachers -would require a 6% increase in teacher wages. Our back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that using ML rather than the current system to promote teachers may be on the order of two or three times as cost-effective as reducing class size by one-third during the first few years of elementary school.
III. General Lessons
In settings where workers vary in their productivity, using ML rather than current systems to hire or promote workers can 1 ML also shows gains relative to the TVA method by Kane et al. (2013) , which controls for one-year lagged test scores and other factors. The ML versus TVA gains are 30-40% as large as the ML versus principal gains. We can also compare the ML approach to a model with two lags, which also yields an ML advantage -but these relative gains are smaller and, with the current data, not statistically significant. In some sense one contribution of ML in this case is to highlight the value of conditioning on the second lag of test scores. potentially improve social welfare. These gains can be large both absolutely and relative to those from interventions studied by standard causal analyses in micro-economics.
Our analysis also highlights several more general lessons. One is that for ML predictions to be useful for policy they need to be developed to inform a specific, concrete decision. Part of the reason is that the decision necessarily shapes and constrains the prediction. For example, for purposes of hiring new police, we need a tool that avoids using data about post-hire performance. In contrast, for purposes of informing teacher tenure decisions, using data on post-hire performance is critical. Instead with data on just those hired we can only inform a different decision -replacing predicted high-risk hires with average-risk officers -that would entail costs (higher wages to expand the applicant pool). Quasiexperimental variation in, say, how applicants are assigned to interview teams could help analysts determine whether department hiring decisions are based partly on information that is not made available to the algorithm.
There are many of these "picking people" applications for which ML prediction tools could be applied. Our goal with this paper is to stimulate more work on these problems. 
